Panqualityism as a Solution to the Mind-Body Problem
I will be conducting research on panqualityism, a position in philosophy of mind that addresses the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem is the question of how consciousness is related to the brain. The two most common solutions to the problem are physicalism and dualism. This past summer, as a part of my Monroe scholarship, I researched an alternative view to these common solutions called panpsychism. According to panpsychism, fundamental physical entities are embedded with minds. In my research paper, I argued that panpsychism fails because tiny minds cannot ‘combine’ to yield larger minds. This issue facing the view is known as the combination problem. Panqualityism is a position a lot like panpsychism that avoids the combination problem. Essentially, panqualitiysm denies that fundamental physical entities are embedded with minds, but maintains that said entities are embedded with specific mental properties. It is my intention to study panqualityism with the specific focus of examining how the position is related to issues in philosophy of perception. Ultimately, I want my honor’s thesis to accomplish two main goals: (i) explain what kind of perceptual theory panqualityism entails and (ii) make an argument for or against panqualityism based on this explanation.
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